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Abstract 
Churchman’s five Inquiring Systems are considered in the 
light of Polanyi’s distinction between Tacit Knowing and 
Practical Thinking. It is suggested that the five Inquiring 
Systems are distinct and crucial elements of the Learning 
Organization that can be divided into two perspectives: 
the modes of Tacit Knowing and the levels of Practical 
Thinking. Tacit Knowing critically contributes to the 
sustainable growth of an organization through its 
connection with (1) intuition (2) holism, and (3) ethics.  
Introduction 
Ideas, and the beliefs that underpin them, are not 
immovable objects nurtured by the interests of a few but 
are vehicles which potentially transport us to change and 
through change to growth. It is clear, at the turn of the 
century, that the time interval between theoretical 
discovery and their practical applications is getting shorter 
(than previously).  Churchman’s account of Inquiring 
Organizations carries the potential for shortening the 
theoretical/practical gap in a way that carries us through 
the changes that arise out of these discoveries and 
applications to sustainable human growth. The potential 
lies in comprehending and exploring in a sustainable way 
the fact that Churchman’s five Inquiring Systems 
articulate themselves through two perspectives: (1) as 
modes of Tacit Knowing, and (2) as varying levels of 
Practical Thinking. The claim of this paper accordingly 
places Pragmatism into one of those two perspectives, 
rather than as Kienholz’ asserts, as the viewpoint which 
“sees four levels at once” [Kienholz, 1999, p 9]. In other 
words, this paper disagrees that Pragmatism (as one of the 
five Inquiring System “types”) is able to see each of the 
other four Inquiring System types at once.  
 
Polanyi’s Practical Thinking and Tacit 
Knowing 
 
From [Haynes, 1999a, p 56-60], we can begin to 
appreciate Polanyi’s distinction between Practical 
thinking and Tacit knowing (also referred to as, 
respectively, Practical and Theoretical knowledge 
[Polanyi 1967, pp 5,6]) with a paradox that Polanyi  
himself discovered in Plato’s work the Meno. Prosch 
[Prosch, 1986, p 96] mentions that: 
 
To search for the solution to a problem, Plato told us there [the 
Meno], would seem to be absurd, since, if you know what you 
are looking for, then there is no problem. If you do not know 
what you are looking for, then you cannot expect to find 
anything. Polanyi maintained that this was a genuine paradox. 
Because, “to see a problem is to see something that is hidden. 
It is to have the intimation of the coherence of hitherto not 
comprehended particulars”.  Yet in spite of the apparent 
contradiction, involved in claiming to be able to see a problem, 
pointed out by Plato long ago, Polanyi noted that people have 
continued for two thousand years to see and solve many 
problems. What the Meno really shows, therefore, said 
Polanyi, is not that knowing is impossible (as indeed Plato also 
thought it did not show) but “that if all knowledge is explicit, 
i.e. capable of being clearly stated, then we cannot know a 
problem or look for a solution”1. Since we apparently do know 
good problems that can be solved, knowing a problem must be, 
he held, a kind of tacit knowledge, like the knowledge we have 
of a face or a class, a knowledge of which we cannot give a 
fully explicit account, but which nonetheless does exist. 
 
In above the passage Polanyi is giving an example of 
Tacit Knowing. For more abundant proof, Polanyi says 
precisely this in his Tacit Dimension [Polanyi, 1967, pp 
22-23] “the kind of tacit knowledge that solves the 
paradox of the Meno consists in the intimation of 
something hidden, which we may yet discover”. Another 
way of appreciating how Tacit Knowing solves the 
paradox of the Meno, is to consider a situation where 
rational thinking is argued not to apply. Flemons in 
Completing Distinctions notes a situation based on Taoist 
principles where rational knowledge is argued to be of no 
use. Consider the following passage [Flemons, 1991, p 
70]:  
 
If we are up against a mystery, then we dare act only on the 
most modest assumptions. The modern scientific program has 
held that we must act on the basis of knowledge  .. but if we 
are up against a mystery, then knowledge is relatively small, 
and the ancient program is the right one: act on the basis of 
ignorance2. 
 
In other words, from the above passage the meaning is 
that in acting from ignorance we are not contaminating 
our intuition (inner teaching) with our rational knowledge 
                                                          
1
  Tacit Dimension, [Polanyi, 1967, p22] 
2
 Quoted from Wendel Berry, in Home Economics, North Point Press, 
San Francisco, 1987, pp 4-5. 
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(outer teaching). In this strict sense then ignorance  can  
ultimately know more than  knowledge. 
On the other hand, practical knowledge for Polanyi does 
not have any hidden aspects to it. Practical knowledge 
gives rise to rational thinking or Practical Thinking. In the 
Tacit Dimension [Polanyi, 1967, p 32, 33], Polanyi states 
that things for which practical knowledge is appropriate 
are “less real” than things for which Tacit Knowing 
applies. He gives the example of cobblestones as being 
more real [than tacitly known things] in the sense of being 
more tangible, but less real in the sense that they have no 
hiddenness to them. Polanyi’s views of the objects of 
practical knowledge align fairly closely with Heidegger’s 
concept of a thing. Joseph Kocklemans in his book On the 
Truth of Being - Reflections on Heidegger’s Later 
Philosophy, had this to say about a third conception of a 
Heideggerian thing that I conclude is close to Polanyi’s 
object of practical knowledge [Kockelmans, 1984, pp 
175,176]:  
 
The thing is nothing but formed matter; and this conception 
also holds good for both natural and man made things. This 
conception accounts for the thingly element we find in every 
work of art. 
 
If an object then is “thingly” it exhibits an absence of 
hiddenness if and only if it is the pure “thingliness” of the 
object that we are considering. Under such circumstances 
it is a candidate for being an object of practical 
knowledge. Drawing upon definitions from Keinholtz 
[Keinholtz, 1999, p 9, Table 1], we can determine that 
objects of practical knowledge are subject to the laws of 
cause and effect and are capable of event analysis and are 
thereby the Practical Thinking domain of the Realist. 
Similarly objects of practical knowledge are observed 
objectively and are highly conducive to pattern analysis 
and are, accordingly, a Practical Thinking domain of the 
Analyst. Finally objects of practical knowledge are above 
all objects of expediency and are perfect for tactical 
rearrangement – but so to are the outcomes of the Idealist 
and the Synthesist. Accordingly, the Practical Thinking of 
the Pragmatist sees practical knowledge and interprets (as 
a category mistake) the mode of Tacit Knowing in the 
same way. The heart of this misconception is clearly 
located in the view that Pragmatism wants to isolate 
“kinds of truth”. This is a damning claim that, in the end, 
gives away Pragmatism’s own inability to tacitly know 
itself! Accordingly, Pragmatism has no sense of Truth as 
an essence. So what is the essence of Pragmatism? By its 
own tenets the answer arises that it depends on what kind 
of truth you take! Consider the following quotation from 
Rorty [Rorty, 1982, p 2]: 
 
Pragmatism cuts across this transcendental/empirical 
distinction by questioning the common presupposition that 
there is an invidious distinction to be drawn between kinds of 
truths. For the pragmatist, true sentences are not true because 
they correspond to reality, and so there is no need to worry 
what sort of reality, if any, a given sentence corresponds to -no 
need to worry about what "makes" it true. … So the pragmatist 
sees no need to worry about whether Plato or Kant was right 
in thinking that something non-spatio-temporal made moral 
judgments true, nor about whether the absence of such a thing 
means that such judgments are is merely expressions of 
emotion" or "merely conventional" or "merely subjective.  
 
Tacit Knowing as Intuition 
 
The paradox of the Meno is a key metaphor for 
enacting innovative solutions to maintain the sustainable 
growth of an organization in the face of uncertainty. 
Accordingly, if we apply each of the five Inquiring 
System types to the problem of the paradox of the Meno, 
then we discover that only the Synthesist and the Idealist 
can solve it. The key ingredient for both Synthesist and 
Idealist is intuition. In the case of the Synthesist, making a 
distinction between appearance and reality (a key feature 
of a Synthesist) already presupposes that intuition is 
operational. Since by definition appearance cannot at the 
same time be real, then it must be intuited to be other than 
real insofar as it appears to be real. Similarly the Idealist 
presupposes intuition to enable its key feature of the 
development of a personal vision through inquiry and 
reflection. A vision holds the potential for a real creation, 
it is fluid and capable of either vanishing or being brought 
into being. Accordingly it is not capable of pragmatic 
manipulation (Pragmatist), or part-like pattern analysis 
(Analyst) or object-like analysis (Realist). Alternatively, 
the Idealist, reflects upon the vision and thus provides the 
necessary intuition for the vision’s further enhancement. 
On this basis the Idealist and Synthesist are 2 modes of 
Tacit Knowing and the Pragmatist, Analyst and Realist 
are 3 levels of Practical Thinking. 
 
Tacit Knowing as Holism 
 
Both the Synthesist and the Idealist develop a viewpoint 
out of which they create respectively their mental models 
and personal visions [Keinholtz, 1999, p 9, Table 1]. The 
viewpoint, so-called, is essentially an ethic, namely, our 
own systems of accepted convictions, from within which 
we speak with conviction, or what I take to be an instance 
of a belief in our own beliefs. But a belief in our own 
beliefs arises out of the whole system of acceptances. Not 
from one piece of knowledge; not one reasoned bit; not 
one logical element or group of logical elements, but the 
whole system.  
 
Tacit Knowing as Ethics 
 
The power of a individual ethic arises because it is 
respectful of the whole system of acceptances. The 
emergence of an ethic for an individual - ethic being a 
belief in the good of things: action that both benefits the 
individual self and others in that one action -  is not 
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sidetracked by any individual desire. Nor is it sidetracked 
by any set of instances of self-gratification, but subsumes 
all of these desires and groups into the whole system of 
beliefs and takes its grounding from that synthesis. In this 
way an ethic develops independently of any logical or 
reasoned process. We do not condition our ethic by 
analysing it, rather our ethic arises out of the integration 
of all of our beliefs and desires. So our ethic is distilled 
and distinctly non-logical; non-reasoned and independent 
of “intellectual” processes. Our ethic retains its capacity 
for intuition because it is independent of reasoning and 
therefore emerges out of a deep sense of care. We are all 
born with this deep sense of care. The quicker the 
emergence, I would suggest, the purer is the process of its 
being grounded and continuation for being grounded. One 
can imagine a paradigm case of an individual not being 
able to produce an ethic from which to base intuitions. 
Such a case would arise where certain obsessions and 
biases of self-gratification precluded a synthesis of the 
whole of the individual beliefs.  
 
Consider now why the question “why does ethics ground 
intuition and logic and reasoning does not?” already 
contains the seeds of its own answer, or already provides 
a viewing of the “tacit” hiddenness of the answer 
[Haynes, 1999b]. Nor does it depend on the arrangement 
of words, I argue in Polanyian terms that a recognition of 
the hiddenness is still possible given further re-
arrangements, such as: 
Does intuition come from ethics or logic and reasoning? 
 
I have indicated that for Polanyi ethics arises or emerges 
from a distillation of beliefs, and that such a distillation 
must have at some stage brought together both opposing 
and consistent beliefs. It is the critical nature of 
emergence that provides the clues to the recognition of 
hiddenness. Polanyi, as Webb notes [Webb, 1988, p 48] 
does “discuss a further major concept .. that of 
‘emergence’.” But Webb further comments [ .. p 48] that 
Lonergan “makes better use of it than Polanyi succeeded 
in doing”. In Philosophers of Consciousness, Webb 
[Webb, 1988, p 78] indicates Lonergan’s extension to 
Polanyi’s concept of emergence was the recognition that 
things that are viewed as recognised as having hidden 
qualities have “proportionate beings … [ and have] .. 
‘parallel structures’ to our knowing”. Webb further 
comments of Lonergan’s contribution   [ .. p 79] that by 
“proportionate being, he says, is intrinsically intelligible 
because it is precisely that which we are able to inquire 
into”. In other words there is something in the question 
itself that triggers a response in the system of beliefs. 
What does this mean? It means that in asking a question 
for which we can recognise a hidden answer, we are 
putting forward a question that has already been asked at 
an unconscious level. At this unconscious level the asking 
has been “sorted out”3 and we, as an individual, are now 
putting that question forward for the conscious level of 
our being to apprehend. This is the way tacit knowing is 
both recognised as hidden and how it makes itself 
manifest as a process of uncovering what is hidden.  
 
Conclusion 
 
All mangers are vitally aware of how important 
intuition is as a guiding principle for their organizations. 
Yet the literature is relatively silent on how it can be 
integrated into a Learning Organization. This paper has 
addressed a way of highlighting Tacit Knowing as a key 
for understanding the intuitional and ethical aspects of the 
Idealist and the Synthesist (2 of the 5 Churchmanian 
Inquiring System types). The gap between theory and 
practice is the distinction between Tacit and Practical 
thinking. Once this distinction is understood the gap can 
be shortened in a sustainable way. Further work entails 
the connection between ethics and intuition and the fact 
that ethics incorporating intuition within a Learning 
Organization is the key to enabling sustainable 
organizational growth. 
 
References 
 
Churchman C West (1971) The Design of Inquiring Systems: 
Basic Concepts of Systems and Organizations. New York: 
Basic Books, Inc. 
Courtney, J, Croasdell, D, Paradice, D “Inquiring 
Organizations”, Foundations of Information Systems: Towards 
a Philosophy of information Technology, at 
http://www.cba.uh.edu/~parks/fis/fisart.htm 
Croasdell, D,Courtney, J, Paradice,D (1998) “Singererian 
Organizations: Guiding Principles and Design Guidelines for 
Learning Organizations”, AMCIS 98. 
Flemons, D.G.,(1991) Completing Distinctions, 
Shambhala Books, Boston, USA. 
Haynes, John D. (1999a)  “Practical and Tacit Knowing 
As a Foundation for Information Systems”, Australian 
Journal of Information Systems,  May, Vol 6, No2, pp 57-
64. 
Haynes, John D. (1999b)   Perspectival Thinking for 
Inquiring Organisations, Thisone and Company, NZ. 
Kienholz, A, (1999) “Systems reThinking: An Inquiring 
Systems Approach to the Art and Practice of the Learning 
Organization”, Foundations of Information Systems,, at 
http://www.cba.uh.edu/~parks/fis/fisart.htm 
Kockelmans, Joseph, J(1984) On the Truth of Being - 
Reflections on Heidegger’s Later Philosophy. Indiana 
University Press Bloomington, USA. 
Polanyi, M., and Prosh, H (1975) Meaning, University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, USA 
                                                          
3
 Or more precisely placed within the context of the synthesis of the 
whole system of beliefs. 
1546
  
Polanyi, M., (1962)Personal Knowledge - Towards a 
Post Critical Philosophy. The University of Chicago 
Press, USA. 
Polanyi, M., (1967) The Tacit Dimension. Anchor Books, 
Double Day and Company, Garden City, New York. 
Prosch, Harry (1986) Michael Polanyi - A Critical 
Exposition. State  University of New York Press, USA. 
Rorty, Richard (1982) Consequences of Pragmatism, at 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/wor
ks/rorty.htm 
Webb, Eugene (1988) Philosophers of Consciousness - 
Polanyi, et al. University of Washington Press. USA. 
1547
